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Constitutional Cases 2016:
An Overview
Benjamin L. Berger, Sonia Lawrence, and Spiros Vavougios*

We are delighted to offer this introduction to the yearly volume of
articles flowing from Osgoode Hall Law School’s annual Constitutional
Cases Conference. The articles in this volume offer insightful and
illuminating analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence from the
Supreme Court of Canada’s 2016 term. In this introduction, we set the
frame for these articles with an overview of the “constitutional year” at
the Supreme Court, identifying some key patterns, themes, and issues
that gave 2016 its distinctive mark. This overview is organized into three
parts. As is the custom for these introductions, in Part I, we begin by
offering a view of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Court in 2016
“on the numbers”. In Part II we reflect on two larger issues that shaped
the Court’s work in 2016: retirements and debates about appointments,
and the pressing question of reconciliation and the Constitution. Finally,
Part III examines the decisions themselves, directing the reader to
articles in this volume which provide in-depth analysis and offering our
observations about how these cases participate in broader themes and
patterns that have been in our sightlines at the Constitutional Cases
conference over the past many years.

I. PART I: 2016: THE YEAR IN REVIEW,
ON THE NUMBERS
From the perspective of the numbers alone, it was a quiet year at the
Court, particularly in constitutional law. In total, the Court decided 56
cases in the 2016 calendar year. Of the 56 cases decided, only 12 are
identified as Constitutional decisions (2 Federalism cases and 10 Charter
*
Benjamin L. Berger is Professor and Associate Dean (Students) and Sonia Lawrence is
Associate Professor and Graduate Program Director at Osgoode Hall Law School. Spiros Vavougios
is a 2017 graduate of the J.D. program at Osgoode and is currently pursuing his LL.M. at Yale
University.
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cases),1 and 4 cases identified deal with constitutional principles or
values.2 In addition, the Court granted a motion extending the suspended
declaration of invalidity in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General).3
This year’s figures continue a steady decline in the overall number of
judgments released by the Court in recent years (79 total cases in 2014,
68 in 2015, and 56 in 2016). Much more notable is what looks like a
dramatic drop in the number of constitutional judgments released (19 in
2014 and 28 in 2015 to 12 in 2016). The proportion of the Court’s
judgments devoted to constitutional issues in 2015 was approximately
40 per cent. In 2016, this figure halved to approximately 21 per cent. It is
difficult to account for this precipitous decline in the number and
proportion of constitutional cases. Is it simply a product of the
vicissitudes of how issues arrive at the Court? Might it be attributable to
the fact that the Court was short staffed after Justice Cromwell retired on
September 1, 2016? Or are there deeper conclusions to be drawn? This is
certainly an issue worth tracking in the coming years.
Looking deeper into the 12 constitutional cases that were issued by the
Court in 2016, it seems that applicants enjoyed considerable success in
advancing their claims. Specifically, in 10 of the 12 constitutional cases,
applicants were successful (a success rate of approximately 83 per cent).
This includes partial successes, as in Conférence des juges (in which 3 of
1
The Constitutional cases identified are: Conférence des juges de paix magistrats du
Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2016] S.C.J. No. 39, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 116, 2016 SCC 39
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conférence des juges”]; R. v. Williamson, [2016] S.C.J. No. 28, [2016] 1
S.C.R. 741, 2016 SCC 28 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Williamson”]; Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs
and Northern Development), [2016] S.C.J. No. 12, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 99, 2016 SCC 12 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Daniels”]; Rogers Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay (City), [2016] S.C.J. No. 23,
[2016] 1 S.C.R. 467, 2016 SCC 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rogers Communications”]; R. v. Saeed,
[2016] S.C.J. No. 24, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 518, 2016 SCC 24 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Saeed”]; R. v.
Jordan, [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 63, 2016 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jordan”]; R.
v. Cawthorne, [2016] S.C.J. No. 32, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 983, 2016 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Cawthorne”]; R. v. Lloyd, [2016] S.C.J. No. 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130, 2016 SCC 13 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Lloyd”]; R. v. Vassell, [2016] S.C.J. No. 26, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 625, 2016 SCC 26
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vassell”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Chambre des notaires du Québec,
[2016] S.C.J. No. 20, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 336, 2016 SCC 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chambres des
notaires”]; R. v. K.R.J., [2016] S.C.J. No. 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906, 2016 SCC 31 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “K.R.J.”]; R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, [2016] S.C.J. No. 14, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 180, 2016
SCC 14 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Safarzadeh-Markhali”].
2
Commission scolaire de Laval v. Syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de Laval,
[2016] S.C.J. No. 8, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 29, 2016 SCC 8 (S.C.C.); Endean v. British Columbia, [2016]
S.C.J. No. 42, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 162, 2016 SCC 42 (S.C.C.); Morasse v. Nadeau-Dubois, [2016]
S.C.J. No. 44, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 232, 2016 SCC 44 (S.C.C.); Windsor (City) v. Canadian Transit Co.,
[2016] S.C.J. No. 54, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 617, 2016 SCC 54 (S.C.C.).
3
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2016] S.C.J. No. 4, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 13, 2016 SCC
4 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carter II”].
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the 5 impugned provisions were struck down) and K.R.J. (in which 1 of
the 2 impugned provisions was read down). Decisions of lower courts
did not fare particularly well: of these 10 successful cases, seven were
appeals of lower court decisions. In the 10 cases in which the Court
found a constitutional violation, the Court employed a variety of
remedies, reading down provisions in 2 cases,4 striking down provisions
in 3 cases,5 and issuing declaratory relief in 5 cases.6
What can we discern from the year’s cases about the roles of the
individual judges of the Court in shaping the Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence? Notably, Karakatsanis and Moldaver JJ. authored the most
constitutional decisions (4 each); in terms of total judgments written,
Brown and Karakatsanis JJ. take the lead with, respectively, 7 and 6
decisions. Justice Karakatsanis’ strong voice in the Court’s jurisprudence in
recent years is particularly interesting in light of early commentary that, as a
newly appointed jurist, she was “struggle[ing] to make an impact”.7 On the
other side of the ledger, Abella and Brown JJ. each authored two dissenting
opinions in constitutional cases. If we move beyond the constitutional
cases, however, many will be interested to see that one of the Court’s
newest members, Côté J., authored the largest number of dissents, at 10.
The first woman appointed to the Court directly from private practice, Côté
J.’s tone and industry suggest that she may come to command an influence
like her two “straight-from-practice” predecessors, Sopinka and Binnie JJ.
The Court released 5 unanimous constitutional decisions: 3 of which
were authored by the Court’s most senior justices (2 by Chief Justice
McLachlin, who has been on the Court since 1989 and 1 by Abella J.,
appointed to the SCC in 2004), 1 joint decision by Karakatsanis, Wagner,
and Côté JJ., and 1 joint decision authored by Wagner and Gascon JJ.
Interesting though they are — and although they offer some watching
briefs for the constitutional work of the Court in the coming years — the
numbers can capture neither the significance of the cases decided, nor the
character of the year as defined by the key issues that the Court faced as
an institution. It is to the latter issues that we now turn.
4

The cases where the impugned provisions were read down include: K.R.J., supra, note 1
and Chambres des notaires, supra, note 1.
5
The Court struck down impugned provisions in Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra, note 1;
Lloyd, supra, note 1; Conference des juges, supra, note 1;
6
Declaratory relief was provided in the following cases: Jordan, supra, note 1; Williamson,
supra, note 1; Vassel, supra, note 1; Rogers Communications, supra, note 1; Daniels, supra, note 1.
7
“A Supreme Court Justice struggles to make an impact”, Editorial, The Globe and Mail
(April 3, 2013), online: Globe and Mail <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/asupreme-court-justice-struggles-to-make-an-impact/article10748372/>.
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II. PART II: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE INSTITUTION
1. The Judges of the Court: A Retirement and an Appointment
This year illustrated the pace of replacement and renewal on the
Supreme Court. When we opened the year, only two judges had been
appointed by someone other than Prime Minister Harper: Chief Justice
McLachlin (appointed to the Court by PM Mulroney and named Chief
Justice by PM Chrétien); Justice Abella (appointed by PM Martin). By the
end of 2016, Justice Malcolm Rowe, the first appointment of the Trudeau
(fils) era was sitting, and Chief Justice McLachlin had announced her
retirement, heralding the coming appointment of a second.
Justice Cromwell retired on September 2, 2016, having been involved in
103 constitutional decisions and 427 overall decisions. Over the course of
his tenure at the Court, Cromwell J. wrote many key constitutional
decisions, leaving a strong mark on the jurisprudence of the Court,
particularly in the Court’s legal rights jurisprudence. For example, in the
context of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,8 his
noteworthy constitutional cases include: R. v. Cornell 9 (reasonableness of
authorized search executed without announcement and forced/hard entry to
preserve evidence); R. v. Vu10 (search and seizure of computers without
specific prior judicial authorization); R. v. Spencer11 (reasonable expectation
of privacy and engagement of informational privacy in the context of
subscriber information associated with an IP address received from an
Internet Service Provider); R. v. Fearon12 (search of cellphones incident to
arrest); and Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of
Canada13 (authorization of sweeping searches in law offices pursuant to
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing provisions found to violate
sections 7 and 8 of the Charter and undermine solicitor-client privilege).14
8
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
9
R. v. Cornell, [2010] S.C.J. No. 31, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142, 2010 SCC 31 (S.C.C.).
10
R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J. No. 6, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, 2013 SCC 6 (S.C.C.).
11
R. v. Spencer, [2014] S.C.J. No. 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, 2014 SCC 43 (S.C.C.).
12
R. v. Fearon, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 2014 SCC 77 (S.C.C.).
13
Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J.
No. 7, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401, 2015 SCC 7 (S.C.C.).
14
Other notable constitutional decisions authored by Cromwell J. include: Reference Re
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 45, 2010 SCC 61 (S.C.C.)
(Cromwell J.’s judgment determined the issues before the Court, which was split as to the validity of
the impugned provisions relating to assisted human reproduction on Division of Powers grounds);
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R.
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Justice Cromwell’s announcement of his retirement came as
something of a surprise (given his age, he could have stayed a further
decade) and it inaugurated vigorous public discourse about his
replacement. It would be the first use of a new set of appointments
procedures which, inter alia, created an independent panel to advise on
appointments, required that candidates be functionally bilingual, but
did not include in its mandate anything about the convention of regional
representation in appointments.15 This disturbed the Atlantic Provinces
Trial Lawyer’s Association so much that they filed an application on
September 19, 2016 with the Nova Scotia Supreme Court. Citing
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6 (Nadon Reference),16 they
sought a declaration that departing from the tradition of regional
representation would be unconstitutional unless treated as a
constitutional amendment.17
The announcement, in late October 2016, of the nomination of
Malcolm Rowe J. calmed those particular anxieties.18 Despite the fact
that he graduated from Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto, his
Newfoundland credentials are well established. With the exception of a
few years in Ottawa, Rowe J. spent his legal career in Newfoundland
and Labrador, where he was appointed to the Trial Division in 1999
693, 2015 SCC 14 (S.C.C.) (whether the principle of cooperative federalism can constrain
Parliament’s legislative power over the destruction of long-gun registry data); Caron v. Alberta,
[2015] S.C.J. No. 54, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2015 SCC 56 (S.C.C.) (language rights in the context of
Alberta’s Alberta Languages Act, which posits that provincial laws and regulations be enacted,
printed, and published in English only); Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United
Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733, 2013 SCC 62
(S.C.C.) (freedom of expression in the context of the Personal Information Protection Act and union
video-taping and photographing individuals crossing picket lines for use in labour dispute); R. v.
Kokopenace, [2015] S.C.J. No. 28, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 398, 2015 SCC 28 (S.C.C.) (writing in dissent
with McLachlin C.J.C., he asserted that the representativeness of a jury roll is tethered to the right to
a jury trial and the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal, as enshrined in s. 11 of
the Charter); and R. v. Jordan, [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, 2016 SCC 27 (S.C.C.)
(writing for the Dissent, he criticized the Majority’s new framework for dealing with the right to be
tried within a reasonable time, cautioning that a numerical ceilings approach will be inadequate in
accounting for fact and case-specific complexities).
15
The Advisory Board was established, and the Terms of Reference approved by the
Governor in Council (“GIC”) on July 29, 2016 (Order in Council PC 2016-0693).
16
[2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nadon Reference”].
17
Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers Association v. The Right Honourable Prime Minister of
Canada and the Governor General of Canada (19 September 2016), Halifax, NSSC SH-455561
(notice of application).
18
“Prime Minister announces nomination of Mr. Justice Malcolm Rowe to the Supreme
Court of Canada” (17 October 2016), online: Prime Minist Can <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/10/
17/prime-minister-announces-nomination-mr-justice-malcolm-rowe-supreme-court-canada>.
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and the Court of Appeal in 2001.19 But other court watchers, primed by
section 8(f) of the Board’s Terms of Reference (“…in establishing a
list of qualified candidates, [the Advisory Board should] seek to
support the Government of Canada’s intent to achieve a genderbalanced Supreme Court of Canada that also reflects the diversity of
members of Canadian society, including Indigenous peoples, persons
with disabilities and members of linguistic, ethnic and other minority
communities including those whose members’ gender identity or
sexual orientation differs from that of the majority…”), and the
statements of the Trudeau government on reconciliation and diversity,
were less impressed.20
The gentle “grilling” Rowe J. received from the Members of the
House of Commons justice committee and Senate legal affairs committee
(along with Bloc Québécois and Green MPs, with law students from
across Canada in attendance) is interesting viewing for initiates. One
watches a delicate dance as the questioners and the nominee try to meet
the serious constraints of the process while still asking questions, and
offering answers, with some semblance of substance.21 Ultimately, the
Q&A process seems to reveal more about our public and political
concerns about judges than it did about Rowe J. or his views on critical
legal questions.
The appointments process is, as this article goes to press, gearing up
again for the selection of Chief Justice McLachlin’s replacement, with
applications due on September 15, 2017.22 The process of appointments

19
Supreme Court of Canada, “Supreme Court of Canada - Biography - Malcolm Rowe”,
(1 January 2001), online: Supreme Court of Canada <http://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx?
id=malcolm-rowe>.
20
Jennifer Taylor, “Preserving regional representation on the SCC; but what about diversity?”,
(20 October 2016), online: CBA Natl <http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/Blog/October-2016/Preservingregional-representation-on-the-SCC;-but.aspx>; Michael Tutton, “Advocates for minority Supreme Court
judge disappointed by Trudeau’s pick”, Tor Star (18 October 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/
news/canada/2016/10/18/advocates-for-minority-supreme-court-judge-disappointed-by-trudeaus-pick.html>;
Nina Corfu, “Another white man on Supreme Court means people of colour ‘shut out’”, CBC News
(18 October 2016), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/supreme-court-appointmentaboriginal-indigenous-african-canadian-diversity-1.3809776>.
21
John Paul Tasker, “Supreme Court nominee Malcolm Rowe grilled on French, diversity
and Aboriginal rights”, CBC News (25 October 2016) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/
politics/malcolm-rowe-committee-questions-1.3820318>; Canada, “Public Record: Parliamentarian
panel questions Malcolm Rowe”, online: CPAC <http://www.cpac.ca/en/programs/public-record/
episodes/49446035> [hereinafter “Tasker”].
22
Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, “Supreme Court of Canada
Appointment Process - 2017” (26 November 2015), online: <https://perma.cc/XN38-ETK7>.

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

OVERVIEW

xlvii

itself has been the subject of a Committee Report (which tended to
support the process followed for Rowe J. in all aspects).23 Observers
have a bit more clarity this time around on the regional representation
matter: the Advisory Board is specifically seeking candidates from
“Western Canada (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and
Manitoba) and Northern Canada (Northwest Territories, Nunavut,
Yukon)”.24 Still very unclear is whether the commitment to functional
bilingualism will, as some have predicted, serve to preclude the
realization of other expressions of diversity, and in particular the
appointment of an Indigenous justice, and whether there is any real
significance to the use and public release of questionnaires filled out in
the application process by the successful candidate.25
2. Reconciliation and The Constitution
It has been some years since Chief Justice McLachlin suggested that
the threshold work for the Charter was completed in the first generation
of the Court’s decision-making,26 leading us to a constitutional moment
focused on the “imperative of achieving reconciliation between Canada’s
First Nations and the Crown”.27 These issues attained a new level of
prominence this year, perhaps ironically, through the efforts of the
Department of Canadian Heritage to celebrate the 150th anniversary of
Confederation by branding it Canada150. The government described
Canada150 as an opportunity to join together and celebrate the country’s

23

Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 9th Report: THE NEW PROCESS
FOR JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (Anthony
Housefather Chair) 22 Feb. 2017 (42nd Parl. 1st Sess). See also Government Response to the 9th
Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 13 June 2017, online: <https://perma.cc/
CC8E-ZTFV>.
24
Supra, note 22 (note that the question of what precisely makes a candidate “from” a
particular region seems to be somewhat flexible).
25
Ian MacLeod, “Supreme Court appointment makes history while keeping traditional
regional balance”, National Post (18 October 2016) online: <http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/
supreme-court-appointment-makes-history-while-keeping-traditional-regional-balance/wcm/6bbd51ef24e4-428b-8bb9-863bb91dde8a>; Canada, supra, note 23.
26
Kirk Makin, “Ten years as top judge and she’s still losing sleep”, The Globe and Mail
(7 January 2010), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ten-years-as-top-judgeand-shes-still-losing-sleep/article1366103/>.
27
The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, “Defining Moments: The Canadian
Constitution”, Remarks delivered on 5 February 2013 at the Canadian Club of Ottawa, online: Supreme
Court of Canada <https://perma.cc/TK2F-JGZP>.
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rich linguistic, cultural, and regional diversity, history, and heritage.28 But
this state-sponsored celebration and the events that were planned under
this umbrella had the interesting, if no doubt unintended effect, of
focusing attention on the genesis of the Canadian state, and the
dispossession and erasure of Indigenous sovereignty that it required.
Critics seized the opportunity to reframe what British North America Act,
1867 accomplished — not as a matter for celebration but as (another,
failed) attempt at erasing Indigenous sovereignties.
Canada150 and the critical discourse it prompted closely followed
and built on discussions following the 2015 release of the Final Report
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Senator Murray Sinclair,
who chaired that Commission, this year reminded Canadians that 1867
marked the beginning of an abusive relationship that culminated in the
precarious economic and social positioning of Indigenous peoples in
Canada today.29 Even the Minister of Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould,
the first Indigenous person to hold that position, commented “It is hard
to celebrate 150 years of colonialism.”30 Indigenous voices in social
media echoed and supported the critique, pressing for more attention
to how Canada150 might be seen and understood in Indigenous
communities. Indigenous artist Isaac Murdoch, from Serpent River
First Nation started the #Resistance150 hashtag to challenge the
erasure of Indigenous history.31 Indigenous organizers including
Freddy Stonypoint and Candace Day Neveau, planned to erect a teepee
on the lawn of Parliament as a “ceremonial reoccupation” during the
Canada Day celebrations.32 Their efforts produced confrontation with

28

Government of Canada, Canada 150, online: Government of Canada <https://perma.cc/
5B86-382V>.
29
Chinta Puxley, “Many Indigenous people see little reason to celebrate Canada’s 150th
birthday” Metro (13 June 2017) online: <http://www.metronews.ca/news/canada/2017/06/13/indigenouspeople-see-little-reason-to-celebrate-canada-150.html> [hereinafter “Puxley”].
30
The Honourable Jody Wilson-Raybould, “Separate Journeys, Similar Path: Truth and
Reconciliation in Canada and South Africa”, Remarks delivered on 30 March 2017 at University of Cape
Town Law School, South Africa, online: Government of Canada <https://perma.cc/6FHM-MKHB>.
31
Puxley, supra, note 29.
32
Jorge Barrera, “Nine arrested after RCMP blocks teepee raising on Parliament Hill” APTN
News (29 June 2017) online: <http://aptnnews.ca/2017/06/29/nine-arrested-after-rcmp-blocks-teepeeraising-on-parliament-hill/>; Alex Ballingall, “Teepee erected on Parliament Hill highlights pain of
Canada 150, activists say”, Toronto Star (29 June 2017), online: <https:// www.thestar.com/news/canada/
2017/06/29/canada-150-protesters-erect-teepee-on-parliament-hill.html>; The Canadian Press, “Sault
group behind teepee on Parliament Hill”, Sault Star (29 June 2017) online: <http://www.saultstar.com/
2017/06/29/sault-group-behind-teepee-on-parliament-hill>; “Negotiated compromise produces ‘historic’
teepee raising on central Parliament Hill lawn”, APTN News (2017), online: <http://aptnnews.ca/
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the RCMP, arrests, and then a negotiated solution and ultimately, a
visit to the teepee from the Prime Minister.33
It is hard to predict what the impact of these national explorations of
historical and contemporary injustices will be in the long term, and the
various ways that they will generate constitutional litigation and doctrine,
but with several significant cases involving Indigenous rights claims on the
horizon, the prominence of these questions across legal, political, and
public arenas feels unprecedented. Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and
Northern Development) was one of the most significant cases of the year,
addressing complicated issues surrounding reconciliation not in the context
of section 35, but, rather, out of the jurisdictional questions created by
section 91(24) — which grants jurisdiction to the federal government over
Indians and lands reserved for Indians.34 Writing for the Court, Abella J.
begins the judgment with a tone that echoes the assertions of the Chief
Justice surrounding our current constitutional moment:
As the curtain opens wider and wider on the history of Canada’s
relationship with its Indigenous peoples, inequities are increasingly
revealed and remedies urgently sought. Many revelations have resulted
in good faith policy and legislative responses, but the list of
disadvantages remains robust. This case represents another chapter in
the pursuit of reconciliation and redress in that relationship.35

At issue in Daniels was whether Métis and non-status Indians are
“Indians” within the meaning of section 91(24). In granting a declaration
in the affirmative, the Court highlighted the practical utility that flows
from such a declaration: previously, both federal and provincial
governments denied responsibility for Métis and non-status Indians,
leaving individuals in these groups in a “jurisdictional wasteland”36 that
deprived them of funding and access to programs, services, and other
intangible benefits that both provincial and federal governments
recognized as necessities.37

2017/06/30/negotiated-compromise-produces-historic-teepee-raising-on-central-parliament-hill-lawn/>;
“‘A state of crisis’: Indigenous group calls for change as Canada Day nears”, CBC News (2017), online:
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/parliament-hill-indigenous-ceremony-june-29-1.4180411>.
33
John Paul Tasker, “Justin Trudeau visits ‘reoccupation’ teepee on Parliament Hill”, CBC
News (2017) online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-visits-reoccupation-teepee-1.4185758>.
34
Daniels, supra, note 1.
35
Id., at para. 1.
36
Id., at para. 14.
37
Id.

l
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The evidentiary foundation relied on by the Court included many
findings made by Phelan J. at the trial level, which established that various
historical, philosophical, and linguistic contexts support the conclusion that
“Indians” under section 91(24) is a broad term that was intended to
encompass all Indigenous peoples in Canada.38 Although the decision
resolves the jurisdictional tug-of-war surrounding Métis and non-status
Indigenous peoples, the decision treated reconciliation in the context of
federalism as narrow and aimed primarily at redress. Two articles in this
collection consider the Daniels decision and its implications for
reconciliation. Thomas Isaac and Arend Hoekstra focus not on the
declaration the Court offered, but on the language it used in the decision.
They highlight that this is the first decision where the Court uses the term
“Indigenous” in a material way: whereas in previous cases the term is used
as an adjective, in Daniels it is employed as a proper noun. The authors
highlight the uncertainty of the scope and purpose of using Indigenous as a
category of identity, while Ron Stevenson traces the way the decision on
section 91(24) relies on argumentation from both the “framers’ intent” or
“originalist” tradition, and from the progressive or “living tree” tradition,
raising concerns about the way this embeds 19th century colonial and racist
ideologies into contemporary constitutional interpretations. What seems
clear from Daniels is that reconciliation in the context of section 91(24)
will be limited to the redress of historic wrongs, and does not give rise to
a duty to legislate.39 The precise nature of the obligations imposed by
section 91(24) moving forward remains obscured; however, the Court’s use
of “policy redress”40 as opposed to legal redress may suggest that the Court
envisages Indigenous peoples and the federal government entering into
dialogue, where a spectrum of needs and interests will be heard without the
imposition of strict legal obligations on the government. Such a vision, of
course, raises questions as to how institutional dynamics between the Court
and the Legislature may be strained as we move further into the
“constitutional moment” of reconciliation.
Beyond Daniels, the judgments which will likely be released by the
Court in 2017 reinforce the prominence and significance of questions
about “reconciliation”. Ktunaxa will require that the Court consider an
Indigenous claim for constitutional justice beyond sections 91(24) and 35.

38
39
40

Id., at para. 6.
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 15.
Id.
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The case involves the assertion of a religious freedom over the Qat’muk
(Jumbo Valley) in British Columbia, the home of the venerated Grizzly
Bear Spirit and has been argued mainly as a section 2(b) claim for
religious freedoms.41 The implications for reconciliation go beyond
redress. As John Borrows notes, constitutional limitations placed on
spiritual rights are particularly injurious in the (neo)colonial context:
It is one thing to place constitutional limits on material culture’s
development, because doing so virtually drives that culture to physical
poverty. However, when constitutional limits are placed on spirituality’s
development, the law stoops even lower. It denies Indigenous people
protection of the inner means to cope with the physical impoverishment
that often developed as a result of European contact. Indigenous peoples’
religious freedoms should not hinge on historic non-Aboriginal contact,
especially when non-Aboriginal Europeans were so harsh in their
treatment of Indigenous religion after contact.42

2017 has already seen a pair of cases on the duty to consult, including
Clyde River,43 in which a unanimous Court provided the following
caution:
True reconciliation is rarely, if ever, achieved in courtrooms. Judicial
remedies may seek to undo past infringements of Aboriginal and treaty
rights, but adequate Crown consultation before project approval is
always preferable to after-the-fact judicial remonstration following an
adversarial process.44

As we progress into the “era” of reconciliation, reflection on the
concept’s historical and constitutional trajectory may help us explore
whether the concept is capable of facilitating the healing of IndigenousSettler relations. In the transcript of their roundtable conversation,
reproduced in this volume, Amar Bhatia, Beverley Jacobs, Jonathan
Rudin, Douglas Sanderson, and Mark Walters consider these and other
issues related to the idea of reconciliation. Bringing diverse expertise and
experience, the group explored the promise and peril, history and
trajectory of the notion of reconciliation and what it might require of us.
41
Supreme Court of Canada, “Webcast of the Hearing on 2016-12-01” (December 1, 2016),
online: <http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/webcasts-webdiffusions-eng.aspx>.
42
John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2010), at 252 [hereinafter “Borrows”].
43
Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 40, 2017 SCC 40
(S.C.C.).
44
Id., at para. 24 (emphasis in original).
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Does reconciliation obscure more than it reveals? Does it harken back to
very early relationships between settlers and Indigenous peoples, such as
those agreed upon in the Covenant Chain and Two-Row wampum,
agreements which sought to solidify healthy relationships? Can the
jurisprudence to this point support a robust version of reconciliation, or
have the interpretations of section 35 so relied on essentializations that
they are bound to produce cramped versions of Indigenous rights and
title, rather than the self-governance or sovereignty that the section could
otherwise encompass? Will reconciliation require that settler institutions
fundamentally consider the depth of the sovereignty asserted by the
colonial state? What is the end game of reconciliation? Is the settler state
prepared to begin the process of recognizing sovereignties and providing
redress, or will this reconciliation era prove to be a form of what legal
historian Reva Siegel has termed “preservation through transformation”:
a legal idea which seems to fundamentally revise the form and content of
doctrine, but ultimately comes to accommodate and further the same
underlying ideas as the law that came before?45

III. PART III: A THEMATIC REVIEW OF THE 2016
JURISPRUDENCE
Marking its 20th anniversary this year, Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional
Cases Conference offers attendees an invaluable review of the Supreme
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, but each year is also a moment in an
ongoing conversation about the themes and patterns that characterize the
Court’s constitutional work. The articles included in this volume offer deep
dives into many of the cases discussed below. But our purpose in what
follows is to place these cases in the stream of certain trends, patterns,
concerns, and debates that have emerged over the last 20 years.
1. Co-Operative Federalism in Division of Powers Decisions
Rogers Communications v. Châteauguay (City) (“Rogers Communications”) provides fodder for analyses of how division of powers
jurisprudence creates and shapes the meaning and possibility of cooperative
federalism. Rogers Communications Inc. (“Rogers”) tried to construct a
45
Reva Siegel, “Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action” (1997) 49 Stan L. Rev. 1111.

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

OVERVIEW

liii

new radiocommunication antenna system in the City of Châteauguay,
pursuant to a spectrum licence, which requires that the company ensures
adequate network coverage in the geographic areas covered by the licence.
In response, the City passed a resolution authorizing the establishment of
a reserve, prohibiting the construction of the antenna system for a period
of two years (it was subsequently renewed for an additional two years),
claiming it was concerned about the health and well-being of the residents
surrounding the installation site.
The Court was unanimous in concluding that the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity operated to render the impugned notice of
reserve inapplicable; however, two conflicting decisions were generated
regarding the pith and substance and thus vires of the resolution
authorizing the impugned notice. Writing for the Majority, Wagner and
Côté JJ. maintained that the pith and substance of the impugned notice
was the siting of a radio communication antenna system, which amounts
to the exercise of federal jurisdiction.46 Conversely, Gascon J., writing
for himself, asserted that the matter of the resolution is the protection of
health and well-being of the City’s inhabitants.47
The Majority’s analysis of pith and substance is sparse. While it is
true that the doctrine is more akin to an art than science, we might have
expected a more explicit engagement with the impugned law’s purpose
and effects. For example, in considering the law’s purpose, Wagner and
Côté JJ. consider a timeline of events,48 including when the notice of
reserve was served, and are led to but one conclusion: that the purpose of
the notice was to prevent Rogers from installing the antenna system at
the property in question. The Majority’s inquiry into the legal and
practical effects of the impugned law are even more cursory: in one
paragraph comprising three sentences, the Majority simply concludes
that the municipal law had the effect of prohibiting the construction of
the antenna system.
In contrast, Gascon J., in considering the purpose of the impugned
law, detailed the resolution’s preamble and the circumstances
surrounding the notice of reserve,49 including evidence heard by the trial
judge of residents’ health concerns. Justice Gascon also noted that the
legal effect of the notice was to enable the City to exercise its power of
expropriation, which falls within its jurisdiction, and of course, the
46
47
48
49

Rogers Communications, supra, note 1, at para. 5.
Id., at para. 79.
Id., at para. 43.
Id., at paras. 92-102.
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practical effect was to prohibit Rogers from constructing its antenna
system.50 Justice Gascon concluded that, at a minimum, the impugned
notice engaged the doctrine of double aspect.51 However, the Majority
rejected this, citing Multiple Access v. McCutcheon52 for the proposition
that the doctrine only applies “when the contrast between the relative
importance of the two features is not so sharp”.53 Having concluded that
the pith and substance of the impugned municipal law was the location of
the radio communication antenna, Wagner and Côté JJ. could not find an
equivalence between the federal and the claimed provincial aspect (health).
To do so would suggest that the province had jurisdiction over the siting of
such infrastructure, contrary to the precedent established by the Privy
Council in Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communications in
Canada, granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government.54
While the majority in Rogers Communications decided the case through
pith and substance alone, they proceeded to apply the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity to “clarify” the law. This is curious, as the
analysis itself adds little, if any, new insight and may muddy the waters
in terms of how these doctrines are to be applied. The Court repeats
that interjurisdictional immunity is reserved for situations that have
been sufficiently covered by precedent.55 A 1905 decision then serves as
the precedent in this case, Toronto Corporation v. Bell Telephone Co. of
Canada, where the Privy Council held that the siting of radio
communication antenna systems lies at the core of the federal power,
ensuring as it does the orderly development and efficient operation of radio
communications in Canada. The interjurisdictional immunity argument
proceeds in a very similar fashion to Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian
Owners and Pilots Assn,56 with the majority concluding that the notice of a
reserve seriously and significantly impaired the core of the federal power,
rendering Parliament unable to achieve the purpose for which it was granted
the power over radio communications.57 What, then, is the ratio of this case?
One possibility is that these cases over the siting of (often unwanted)
50

Id., at paras. 103-106.
Id., at para. 116.
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Multiple Access v. McCutcheon, [1982] S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161 (S.C.C.).
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Id., at 182.
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Rogers Communications, supra, note 1, at paras. 50-51.
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[2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 77-78 (S.C.C.). See also Quebec (Attorney General) v.
Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 at para. 58 (S.C.C.).
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infrastructure such as radio communications antennae and aerodromes have
a particular logic to them which simply cannot allow for provincial overlap,
since this would consistently prove ruinous to the federal power.
The general trend for some time has been more recognition of
overlapping jurisdiction, and judicial decisions that favour cooperative
federalism.58 Justice Gascon’s dissent continues this tradition, drawing on
the principles of presumptive constitutionality, subsidiarity, and cooperative
federalism to describe a flexible approach “tailored to the modern
conception of federalism, which allows for some overlapping and favours
a spirit of cooperation”.59 Justice Gascon cites Professor Hogg for
the proposition that “in choosing between competing, plausible
characterizations of a law, the court should normally choose one that would
support the validity of the law”.60 The Majority, however, disagreed:
[the principle of cooperative federalism] can neither override nor modify
the division of powers itself. It cannot be seen as imposing limits on the
valid exercise of legislative authority [citations omitted.] Nor can it
support a finding that an otherwise unconstitutional law is valid.61

The outcome, a case in which jurisdiction is ousted, seems to cut
against the trend. But it may simply illustrate a more subtle trend. In
2011, Professor Bruce Ryder noted the centrality of the principle of equal
autonomy—which accords equal weight and consideration to the claims
of the legislatures in their exercise of autonomy over distinct policy
objectives within their jurisdiction—to the Supreme Court’s federalism
jurisprudence.62 He highlighted the Court’s commitment to a flexible
vision of federalism that favours a generous interpretation of both federal
and provincial heads of power; indeed, prior to 2010, the last case where
a provincial or municipal law was found to be ultra vires through the
doctrine of pith and substance was the Morgentaler63 decision in 1993.
Yet, from 2010 onward, Ryder noted an increasing number of fissures
within the Court as to the vires of impugned provisions. As we near the end
58
See, for example, Wade K, Wright, “Facilitating Intergovernmental Dialogue: Judicial
Review of the Division of Powers in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 625.
See also Warren Newman, “The Promise and Limits of Cooperative Federalism as a Constitutional
Principle” (2016)76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 67.
59
Id., at para. 93.
60
Id.; Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2007), at 15-23.
61
Rogers Communications, supra, note 1, at para. 39.
62
Bruce Ryder, “Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search for
Balance in the Interpretation of the Division of Powers” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 565.
63
R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] S.C.J. No. 95, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, 107 D.L.R. (4th) 537 (S.C.C.).
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of the McLachlin era, it will be interesting to consider the extent to which
the Court’s jurisprudence reflects a return to the centralist-decentralized
debates engaged in by Chief Justice Laskin and Beetz J. It is possible to
read Rogers Communications as another step along that path.
2. Constitutional Protection of Lawyer/Client Relationships and
section 8 of the Charter
Canada (Attorney General) v. Chambre des notaires du Québec et
Barreau de Québec64 illustrates an interaction between solicitor-client
privilege and section 8 of the Charter, producing constitutional limits on
the disclosures that the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) can require in
the course of its investigations.
At issue in Chambre des Notaires were sections 231.2 and 231.7 of the
Income Tax Act (“ITA”), which,65 allowed requirements to be issued
directly to notaries in Quebec to provide documents relating to their clients
for tax collection or auditing purposes, and allowed the Minister to apply to
a court for execution of a requirement sent out pursuant to section 231.2.
The position of the CRA was that the information sought under the
requirement fell within the “accounting records” exception set out in the
definition of solicitor-client privilege (under section 232(1) of the ITA).
Writing for a unanimous court, Wagner and Gascon JJ. concluded that
sections 231.2(1), 231.7, and 232(1) violated section 8 of the Charter and
were thus of no force or effect in relation to Quebec notaries and lawyers
for all documents protected by professional secrecy. The Court
characterized professional secrecy as both a legal principle of supreme
importance and principle of fundamental justice.66
The Court easily found a violation of the right against unreasonable search
and seizure. On the one hand, notaries’ clients’ reasonable expectations of
privacy were implicated because the requirements targeted information or
documents that would normally be protected by confidentiality.67 The Court
was clear that the civil and administrative context of the documents captured
by the ITA’s requirement scheme did not diminish the taxpayer’s expectation
of privacy. On the other hand, in balancing clients’ individual privacy with
the state’s interest in carrying out the search or seizure to collect amounts
64
65
66
67
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owing to CRA, the Court concluded that the search pursuant to the
requirement scheme was unreasonable. Specifically, where the privacy
interest implicates the professional secrecy of legal advisors, the usual
balancing exercise under section 8 will rarely, if ever, cut against the
individual’s privacy interest. The Court maintained that a stringent standard is
necessary in order to protect professional secrecy. This standard means that
legislative provisions that interfere with professional secrecy in a manner that
is more than absolutely necessary will be found unreasonable.68
Several defects in the requirement scheme caused it to fall below this
stringent standard.69 First, the client of a notary faced with a requirement
was not given notice.70 Second, an inappropriate burden was placed on
the notary or lawyer.71 Third, compelling disclosure was not absolutely
necessary. For example, it is clear that the impugned search was not a
measure of last resort: the information sought by the Minister could have
been made available through alternative sources, like financial
institutions, which do not have the same onerous confidentiality
requirements as notaries in Quebec.72 Finally, the scheme included no
measures to help mitigate the impairment of professional secrecy. To
assist Parliament in drafting a scheme that sufficiently mitigates concerns
surrounding professional secrecy, Wagner and Gascon JJ. point to a
directive issued by Revenu Québec, stating that the Revenu will attempt
to obtain the documents from alternative sources first, and undertake not
to prosecute a notary who invokes professional secrecy in good faith.73
The exclusion of notaries’ and lawyers’ accounting records from the
definition of solicitor-client privilege was also deemed to violate section 8
of the Charter. The Court was clear that the legislature is not free to
abrogate professional secrecy by statutory authorizations allowing for the
seizure of information that would otherwise be exempt from the duty to
disclose, unless it was absolutely necessary to achieving the scheme’s
objective. Since the Court was not convinced that giving the State access
to such protected information was absolutely necessary to realizing the
objective of tax collection, the broad and imprecise definition of
solicitor-client privilege did not pass constitutional muster.74
68
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In this volume, Amy Salyzyn considers the decision in Chambres des
notaires. She highlights analytical tensions that emerge in light of the
Court’s reliance on the Charter, typically used to protect individuals, to
safeguard the lawyer-client relationship from governmental intrusions.
Salyzyn notes that in both Chambres des notaires and Canada (Attorney
General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada75 — the Court
curiously characterizes solicitor-client privilege as a fundamental
principle that cannot be interfered with unless the stringent threshold
of “absolute necessity” is passed, while simultaneously working with
the rule under section 8 of the Charter, which protects against
“unreasonable” searches and seizure.
The result is a constitutional incongruity whereby an extremely high
threshold is tethered to the concept of reasonableness. Salyzyn queries the
extent to which this results in the establishment of solicitor-client privilege
as a constitutional right that supersedes other rights. If so, this could place
the Court in a “constitutional straightjacket” in future cases. Given the high
threshold of absolute necessity, Salyzyn also wonders if even the mitigation
that Wagner and Gascon commended in their reasons would survive
constitutional scrutiny in any subsequent Charter challenge.
3. Mandatory Minima: End of a Story?
Lloyd is the third case since the Charter’s enactment in which the Court
has struck down a mandatory minimum, the previous two decisions being
R. v. Smith76 and R. v. Nur.77 In Lloyd, the accused was charged with
possession of methamphetamine and heroin. Because Mr. Lloyd had
previously been convicted of several drug-related offences, he was subject
to section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
[hereinafter “CDSA”],78 which required the sentencing judge to impose a
mandatory sentence of one year. The scope of the impugned provision was
summarized by Chief Justice McLachlin in the following way:
To be subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of one year of
imprisonment, an offender must be convicted of trafficking, or of
possession for the purpose of trafficking, of either any quantity of a
75

Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 7,
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Schedule I substance, such as cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine, or
three kilograms or more of a Schedule II substance, namely cannabis:
s. 5(3)(a) and (a.1) of the CDSA. The offender must also have been
convicted within the previous 10 years of a “designated substance
offence”, which is defined at s. 2(1) of the CDSA as any offence under
Part I of the CDSA other than simple possession.79

Despite the apparent narrowness of the provision, the Majority in
Lloyd found that the mandatory minimum amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment, contrary to section 12 of the Charter. Specifically, Chief
Justice McLachlin maintained that although the impugned provision was
not grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the accused in this
case, it was nonetheless so because the impugned provision applied in
many situations to offenders with significantly varying degrees of moral
blameworthiness, and further, because the definition of trafficking and
the scope of the designated substance offences were too broad.80
The test for determining if a mandatory minimum sentencing
provision violates section 12 of the Charter was most recently articulated
by the Court in Nur. First, the Court must determine what a proportionate
sentence for an offence would be, having regard to the objectives and
principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code.81 Second, the Court must
then consider whether the mandatory minimum imposed by Parliament
would require the sentencing judge to impose a sentence that is grossly
disproportionate to the offence and its circumstances.82
In considering the second step of the analysis, the Chief Justice
crafted two reasonable hypotheticals to demonstrate how the impugned
mandatory minimum provision would be grossly disproportionate in
foreseeable cases. The first hypothetical involves a drug addict who is
charged for sharing a small amount of a Schedule I drug with a spouse or
friend. The second hypothetical involves a drug addict who is charged
with trafficking a Schedule I drug for a second time to support his own
addiction and who, in between conviction and sentencing, attends
rehabilitation and overcomes his addiction.83 In both scenarios, the Chief
Justice concluded that a mandatory sentence of one year would shock the
conscience of Canadians.84
79
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Writing in dissent, Wagner, Gascon, and Brown JJ., asserted that the
impugned provision was sufficiently tailored and narrow so as not to offend
section 12 of the Charter,85 and emphasized the degree of deference that
Parliament is entitled to in crafting mandatory minima.86 The dissenting
justices also rejected the hypotheticals crafted by the Chief Justice, arguing
that the minimum would not apply in those scenarios, and even if it did
apply, the scenarios are akin to the circumstances of Mr. Lloyd, for whom
the Majority agreed that a one-year sentence was not cruel and unusual.87
Notable in Lloyd is the Court’s reflection of the specificity and narrowness
that will be required of Parliament if it is to create constitutionally compliant
mandatory minima. It seems that the era of proliferating mandatory minima
through which we have recently lived might well be at an end, an end marked
by Lloyd. Yet Lloyd also offers fodder for debate in the form of the Court’s
commentary on the role that statutory exemptions allowing for judicial
discretion could play in preserving the constitutionality of mandatory
sentences. The Chief Justice suggests as follows:
Another solution would be for Parliament to build a safety valve that would
allow judges to exempt outliers for whom the mandatory minimum will
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Residual judicial discretion for
exceptional cases is a technique widely used to avoid injustice and
constitutional infirmity in other countries [citation omitted]… It allows the
legislature to impose severe sentences for offences deemed abhorrent,
while avoiding unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences in exceptional
cases. The residual judicial discretion is usually confined to exceptional
cases and may require the judge to give reasons justifying departing from
the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by the law. It is for the
legislature to determine the parameters of the residual judicial discretion.88

Although permitting discretion in the context of mandatory minimum
sentences might well address some of the excesses and flaws intrinsic to
mandatory minima, this approach also raises concerns surrounding the
certainty and predictability expected from the criminal law, which may
also produce troubling implications for the rule of law,89 an issue that the
Court seemed concerned with in Ferguson.90
85
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The piece by Asad G. Kiyani in this volume addresses the
uneasiness raised by some that Lloyd’s reading in of highly
individualistic circumstances into the reasonable hypothetical test
under section 12 of the Charter may open the floodgates such that it
will be near impossible for Parliament to craft a mandatory minimum
scheme that survives constitutional scrutiny. Kiyani argues that such
concerns are overstated: judicial practice suggests that both before
and after Lloyd, the courts have preserved mandatory sentences much
more frequently than they have struck them down. Further, he notes
that notwithstanding judicial pronouncements on the importance of
section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and the Gladue principles, which
call on the courts to consider the circumstances of racialized offenders
in determining a just sanction, the jurisprudence on section 12 has
been silent as to how these factors ought to be relevant in the context
of a gross disproportionality analysis. For Kiyani, this deficiency in
conjunction with the Court’s non-recognition of proportionality as a
principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter further
subverts any possibility that sections 12 and 15 might be integrated in
order to address concerns of substantive equality in sentencing and the
criminal justice system more broadly. Kiyani not only challenges
readers to consider how race and Aboriginal status have been glossed
over in the Court’s construction of reasonable hypotheticals under
section 12 (as in Lloyd, for example), but further, to consider how such
constructions actually centre around white and male privilege (as in
Nur, for example).
4. Widening Police Powers
On the strength of its decisions on sentencing91 and on the limits of
substantive criminalization,92 over the past many years the Court has
benefitted from a developing narrative about its progressive, skeptical
take on the expansion of crime and punishment through the criminal law.
In many instances, it has been positioned as the counterweight to a
government with a “tough on crime” agenda. And yet over those same
years there has been a quiet countercurrent in the Court’s constitutional
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work in the criminal law, marked by a significant and steady expansion
of police powers.93 R. v. Saeed94 further illustrates this trend.95
At issue in the case was whether the common law power of search
incident to arrest authorizes penile swabs to secure the DNA of
complainants from suspects in the course of sexual assault investigations.
The case produces three sets of reasons that highlight deep fissures as to
the appropriate authorities that ought to be applied in determining the
reasonableness of the impugned search in the context of section 8 of the
Charter. On the one hand, the samples that are acquired from a penile
swab are akin to the seizure of bodily samples, for which the Stillman96
framework could apply; on the other, penile swabs can be seen as
significantly interfering with the bodily integrity and dignity of a suspect,
which would seem to implicate the considerations identified around strip
searches in Golden.97
Writing for the Majority, Moldaver J. concluded that although penile
swabs amount to a significant intrusion on the privacy interests of
suspects, such swabs will be reasonable where, as in this case, police
have “reasonable grounds to believe that the search will reveal and
preserve evidence of the offence for which the accused was arrested, and
the swab is conducted in a reasonable manner”.98 Drawing on Golden as
a framework, Moldaver J. identified 10 factors that Courts may draw on
to discern the reasonableness of penile swabs.99
For Moldaver J., Stillman did not apply to create a requirement for
police to obtain consent or a warrant to seize bodily samples or
impressions. This is because, in contrast to the bodily samples or
impressions protected under Stillman, a penile swab is not designed to seize
the bodily samples of the accused; rather, it is the complainant’s DNA that
is sought.100 Accordingly, a penile swab does not implicate the same
privacy interests of an accused person, since no personal information of the
93
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suspect is revealed.101 Furthermore, in contrast to the taking of dental
impressions or the removal of hair from a suspect’s body, Moldaver J.
posits that a penile swab is less invasive in that it does not involve
penetration or the placement of objects or substances inside the suspect.102
Finally, evidence of the complainant’s DNA that is sought via the swab
degrades over time and can be destroyed by the accused, implicating
concerns about the preservation of reliable evidence.103
Justices Karakatsanis and Abella disagreed. Specifically, Karakatsanis J.
maintained that although Stillman did not expressly address the issue of
genital swabs, the principles underlying that decision suggest that an
inappropriate balance would be struck between privacy interests and the
state’s interest in investigating crimes if the common law authorized
warrantless genital swabs.104 Notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the
search, Karakatsanis J. held that the evidence was properly admitted.
Justice Abella was the sole judge to find that the penile swab violated
section 8 of the Charter and was not properly admissible under section 24(2)
of the Charter. The empassioned tone of her dissent is captured at
paragraph 167, where she asserts:
[T]he deliberate failure to consider a warrant in the absence of exigent
circumstances is, at its best, careless; ignoring the legal possibility that
under Canadian law the police were not even entitled to take a penile
swab, is fatal.

The article by Christine Mainville in this volume argues that
Moldaver J.’s reasoning overstates the importance of the informational
privacy impacted by the swab (the complainant’s DNA) and fails to
sufficiently account for the personal privacy interest that is inherently
engaged when genitalia are searched. For Mainville, the assumption that
a penile swab is not as invasive as the samples and impressions described
in Stillman is unfounded.
5. Jordan and the Right to be Tried Within a Reasonable Time
Perhaps the most controversial decision released in 2016 — and
certainly the one with the most immediately sweeping impact on the
administration of justice in Canada — was Jordan,105 in which a deeply
101
102
103
104
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split106 Court revamped the framework for addressing the right to be tried
within a reasonable time. At the heart of the new scheme is the
establishment of presumptive ceilings, which, if surpassed, will lead to a
presumption that accused’s rights under section 11(b) have been violated.
The presumptive ceilings for trials proceeding in Provincial Court and
Superior Court are, respectively, 18 and 30 months.107 Delays caused by
the defence are subtracted from the total delay.108 For the Crown to
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness that would otherwise give rise
to a stay of proceedings, it must establish the presence of exceptional
circumstances.109
Writing in dissent, Cromwell J. charged the Majority’s approach as
unnecessary and unlikely to inject simplicity into the law, highlighting
that inquiries into the reasonableness of time is a delicate, fact-sensitive
and case-specific exercise that cannot adequately be accounted for
through use of blunt tools like presumptive ceilings.110 He further
maintained that the setting of ceilings is a polycentric enterprise that is
better left to the legislature, and that the ceilings selected by the Majority
do not accord with the past 10 years of section 11(b) jurisprudence.111
Finally, Cromwell J. expressed the concern that the “ceilings will put
thousands of cases at risk of being judicially stayed”.112
Two pieces in this volume grapple with the decision in Jordan and
offer insight into how the Court’s deployment of presumptive ceilings
is perhaps unsurprising and indeed responsive to various problems
generated by previous section 11(b) jurisprudence. Steve Coughlan
provides a historically and sociologically rich analysis on the distinction
between individual and institutional delay and competing notions of
prejudice, and how these factors influenced not only the development
of the law surrounding unreasonable delay, but moreover, the attitudes of
actors within the criminal justice system.
Coughlan further argues that the establishment of presumptive
ceilings was necessary to address the tendency of trial judges to use the
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judicial discretion under the previous Morin113 regime to explain away
delay. He argues, the main problem harkens back to a concern first
expressed by Lamer J., as he then was, in Rahey.114 Specifically, Lamer J.
posited that security of the person prejudice should be sufficient to
establish a violation of the right enshrined by section 11(b) of the
Charter, and further, that liberty and fair trial prejudices should be
irrelevant to the analysis.115 This view was ultimately not accepted by the
Court in subsequent cases like Askov.116 For Coughlan, the concern
expressed by Lamer J. foreshadowed problems that quickly materialized
in the section 11(b) jurisprudence: because evidence of liberty and fair
trial prejudice cases made some cases appear stronger than others, cases
advanced solely on the basis of security of the person prejudice appeared
weak, with the effect that institutional delay was overlooked.
Palma Paciocco also offers thoughtful insight into possible practical
consequences that may flow from Jordan, which would be contrary to
the interests of the public and accused persons. Specifically, she
cautions that excising actual prejudice suffered from the analysis may
have the effect of incentivizing the Crown to pressure accused persons
to enter into guilty pleas at increased rates, which would produce
negative implications for fair trial rights. Moreover, she posits that the
absence of actual prejudice renders uncertain how section 11(b) will
accommodate young offenders who, on account of having different
perceptions of time and a reduced ability to appreciate the connection
between actions and consequences, experience delay prejudice
differently than adult accused.
6. Proportionality as a Principle of Fundamental Justice
Over the last 20 years, proportionality reasoning has found its way
deep into the constitutional jurisprudence addressing the criminal justice
system and legal rights,117 just as it has become the mainstay of Charter
jurisprudence at large. One might say that momentum in this direction
reached an apex with LeBel J.’s suggestion in Ipeelee that “proportionality
in sentencing could aptly be described as a principle of fundamental
113
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justice under s. 7 of the Charter”.118 Would this mean that criminal laws
(all of which intrinsically implicate the liberty interest under section 7)
could be challenged for “mere” disproportionality?
Viewed in this frame, along with Lloyd, the Court’s decision in R. v.
Safarzadeh-Markhali119 no doubt left criminal law lawyers and scholars
with mixed feelings.
On the one hand, the Court’s use of section 7 of the Charter in
Safarzadeh-Markhali illustrates the vigour of the principle of overbreadth
in Charter litigation120 and clarified the proper methodology to employ
when expounding the purpose of an impugned provision or statute in
the context of section 7.121 The Court found that section 719(3.1) of the
Criminal Code, which made enhanced credit unavailable to offenders who
were denied bail primarily because of prior convictions, violated section 7
in that it was overbroad in relation to its purpose: the impugned provision
had the effect of catching a broad range of offenders in ways that do not
contribute to the enhancement of public safety and security.122
On the other hand, both here and in Lloyd the Court rejected the
Respondent’s and Ontario Court of Appeal’s assertion that the principle
of proportionality was a freestanding principle of fundamental justice
within the meaning of section 7.123 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief
Justice McLachlin in Safarzadeh-Markhali maintained that the principle of
proportionality in sentencing enshrined in section 718.1 of the Criminal
Code and Ipeelee, though fundamental, is not a principle of fundamental
justice and does not have constitutional status. She reiterated that the
“constitutional dimension” of proportionality in sentencing is the prohibition
of grossly disproportionate sentences under section 12 of the Charter.124
Similarly, in Lloyd, the Chief Justice asserted that the principles of
fundamental justice in section 7 must be defined in a way that promotes
both coherence within the Charter and conformity to the appropriate
institutional roles of Parliament and the Judiciary.125 Specifically, she
notes126 that the recognition of proportionality as a free-standing principle of
118

R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, 2012 SCC 13, at para. 37

(S.C.C.).
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra, note 1.
Id., at paras. 50-55.
Id., at paras. 24-49.
Id., at para. 52.
Id., at paras. 67-73.
Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra, note 1, at 70.
Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 40.
Id., at para. 42.

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

OVERVIEW

lxvii

fundamental justice would be inconsistent with the Court’s decision in
Malmo-Levine, in which the Court stated that sections 7 and 12 of the
Charter cannot impose different standards with respect to the proportionality
of punishment:
Is there then a principle of fundamental justice embedded in s. 7 that
would give rise to a constitutional remedy against a punishment that
does not infringe s. 12? We do not think so. To find that gross and
excessive disproportionality of punishment is required under s. 12 but
a lesser degree of proportionality suffices under s. 7 would render
incoherent the scheme of interconnected “legal rights” set out in ss. 7
to 14 of the Charter by attributing contradictory standards to ss. 12 and 7
in relation to the same subject matter. Such a result, in our view, would
127
be unacceptable.

Furthermore, the Chief Justice in Lloyd cautioned that the recognition of
proportionality as a principle of fundamental justice would destabilize
institutional dynamics by allowing judges to subvert the norms of
punishment generated by Parliament — a matter which is properly within
the realm of policy choices to which Parliament is owed deference.128
Interestingly, in both Safarzadeh-Markhali and Lloyd, the Court did
not even attempt to apply the framework for analyzing whether a
principle of fundamental justice could be established.129
The article in this volume by Andrew Menchynski and Jill R. Presser
considers the Markhali decision and argues that the Court’s focus on the
principles of gross disproportionality, overbreadth, and arbitrariness in
recent section 7 jurisprudence produces a troubling set of implications
for the role that section 7 of the Charter may have in advancing
substantive rights in the future. Specifically, the authors argue that the
Court’s emphasis on instrumental rationality ensures only that the
objective and means of an impugned provision are aligned, and that this
may frustrate the philosophical foundation of section 7 as a vehicle
through which minority groups can secure substantive protection under
the Charter. For Menchynski and Presser this is concerning, because in
127

R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 2003 SCC 74 at para.
160 (S.C.C.).
128
Lloyd, supra, note 1, at paras. 43-45.
129
Per Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth, and the Law v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 2004 SCC 4 (S.C.C.), the test for what amounts to
a new principle of fundamental justice within the meaning of s. 7 is: (1) the proposed principle must
be a legal principle; (2) there must be consensus that the proposed principle is essential to our shared
notions of justice; and (3) the proposed principle must be capable of being identified with precision
and applied in a manner that yields predictable results.

lxviii

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

their view, the utility of arbitrariness and overbreadth will diminish since
Parliament exercises influence over the sources through which legislative
purpose is determined. Moreover, analyses on instrumental rationality do
not entrench in stare decisis in a substantive way, even though such
principles may be used to strike down substantively wrong laws. Finally,
the authors express a concern that a commitment to instrumental
rationality only precludes the Charter from functioning as a living tree
that recognizes the progressive social values of the day.

7. K.R.J. and the Interplay Between the Rule of Law and the
Liberal and Purposive Approach to interpreting section 11
Charter rights
K.R.J. is a case that shows an interplay between the Court’s concern for
the rule of law and its commitment to a liberal and purposive approach to
delineating the scope of rights guaranteed under the Charter. Specifically,
the case addressed the question of whether section 161(1) of the Criminal
Code—which restricts the liberty interests of convicted sexual offenders
who pose an ongoing risk to children through means such as prohibitions
against using computer systems to communicate with minors and using the
Internet generally—constitutes “punishment” within the meaning of
section 11(i) of the Charter. This, in turn, determines the constitutionality
of their retroactive application to K.R.J.
In finding that the impugned prohibition orders constitute punishment,
the Court recalibrated the test under section 11 to clarify when measures
aimed at public protection will amount to punishment, having regard to the
impact the measure has on the offender’s liberty and security interests.
Specifically, in K.R.J. a third consideration was added to the test under
section 11. Under the new approach a measure will be punishment where:
(1) It is a consequence of conviction that forms part of the arsenal of
sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular
offence, and either
(2) it is imposed in furtherance of the purpose and principles of
sentencing, or
(3) it has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty or security interests.130
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The piece by Stacey D. Young in this volume posits that the decision in
K.R.J. will invite future litigation on ancillary orders, which the author
notes have proliferated in recent years. Specifically, Young posits the
decision in K.R.J. may change the categorization of forfeiture orders for
offence-related property such that they are now punishment within the
meaning of section 11. For example, the use of property in the commission
of an offence may have the effect of tainting the property, such that it is
properly the subject of a forfeiture order under Part XII.2 of the Criminal
Code. Because such an order may remove the offender’s ability to deal
with their property, it is possible that their liberty or security interests may
be significantly impacted, which, under the third prong of the test
articulated in K.R.J., could result in the order amounting to punishment.
For Young, the Court’s decision in K.R.J. signifies a less deferential
approach to Parliament and suggests that it will no longer be sufficient to
generate measures or sanctions aimed primarily at public protection to
evade characterization as punishment and thereby shield the measure
from scrutiny under section 11 of the Charter. Notwithstanding that the
purpose of a measure may indeed be public protection, the impact that
the impugned measure has on an offender must now be considered: if the
measure rises to the level of punishment, its retroactive application will
be contrary to section 11 of the Charter.

IV. CONCLUSION
The contributions to this volume offer a rich and lively entry point
into not only understanding key dimensions of the Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence in 2016, but larger themes with which the Court, judges,
lawyers, and scholars are actively wrestling. As we have suggested,
foremost among those larger themes are questions about the political and
institutional role of the Court within the constitutional “architecture” of
the country, and in particular, the way in which the Supreme Court of
Canada will play its part in the defining question of our contemporary
constitutional moment: is there a route through reconciliation to a just
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state?
As we look ahead, and with this challenge — on which she has shone a
spotlight — in mind, it is impossible to ignore the pending retirement of the
Chief Justice of Canada, Beverley McLachlin, who has led the Court since
January 7, 2000. We look forward to contributing to the reflection on the
full shape and import of her legacy in these pages next year.

